A VOICE FOR LIBERTY
STEWART DALZELLt

I first saw Henry W. Sawyer, III in action in 1973 when I served as
his junior associate in an unfair competition case that had been
transmuted into a Sherman Act section 1 claim. The defendants retained Henry after suffering what was for them a catastrophic verdict
at the hands of ajury in a Philadelphia federal court. When I came
into Henry's office, he explained to me that the five individual defendants were facing personal ruin as a result of the verdict and, more
immediately, from execution on the seven-figure treble damage
award.
Our urgent task was to stay execution on the judgment, while the
plaintiff corporation, through its able counsel, was insisting that the
individuals post their houses as security for the stay under Rule 62(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since all five of these men
were married, this meant that their wives' interests were at stake and,
as one would expect, they were horrified at the prospect of losing
their homes. We therefore filed a motion on behalf of the wives (as
well as their husbands) for relief from this Draconian condition, and
shortly thereafter, I for the first time, saw Henry Sawyer as an advocate, pressing our motion before my now-colleague, Judge Raymond
Broderick.
What immediately struck me as I heard Henry arguing our motion
was what a terrific, impressive voice he had. If memory serves correctly, we were seated in Judge Broderick's chambers at the old Federal Courthouse at Ninth and Market Streets in Philadelphia. Seemingly without raising the volume, Henry Sawyer's rich bass voice
nevertheless filled the room and kept everyone-most importantly,
Judge Broderick-in rapt attention. I still can hear the sound of that
voice saying to Judge Broderick, at a time when the women's movement was still largely a gleam in feminists' eyes, "Your Honor, women
are people. They have an existence and interests separate and apart
from their husbands. These women had nothingin any way, shape, or
t United States District CourtJudge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. B.S.
1965, J.D. 1969, University of Pennsylvania. Judge Dalzell was associated with the
Philadelphia law firm of Drinker Biddle & Reath from 1970-1976, and then was a partner with that firm (with Henry W. Saywer, III) until leaving for the bench in 1991.
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form to do with what the plaintiff claims in this case."
To my amazement, and before my very eyes, the voice worked its
magic. At least to the extent that we were given the opportunity to
provide substitute security-as it turned out, for less than the full
amount of the verdict-the marital homes were never again in danger. Indeed, the case ultimately settled on appeal,1 on terms that
brought our clients back from the brink of bankruptcy and enabled
them to put their energies and talents to rather rewarding business
successes in later years. As one might imagine, they were convinced
that Henry W. Sawyer, III had saved their business and personal lives.
They were right.
I thereafter had the great good fortune of working closely with
Henry Sawyer in other commercial litigation, most notably Outboard
Marine Corp. v. PezeteL2 In that case, we represented the then-stateowned Polish entities who made golf carts that sold so successfully in
this country that the domestic manufacturers of those vehicles became
rather upset.3 In Pezetel and in other cases, I heard that unforgettable
voice, witnessed its crafty modulations, and beheld what it could do to
many tribunals and gatherings of lawyers.
Indeed, over the course of the more than fifty years that Henry
Sawyer practiced after his graduation from this law school in 1947, he
used that highly sophisticated voice in many cases in courts around
this country.4 As successful as Henry Sawyer was in tuning that voice
to advance the interests of his paying clients, he always in my years of
practice with him saw those cases, however zealously he argued them,
as a means to a larger end. Successful as he was in these private, and

I The case discussed in the text is C. Albert Sauter Co. v. RichardS. Sauter Co., 368 F.
Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
Interestingly, Henry was recommended to the Poles by Professor Louis B.
Schwartz, who taught me criminal and antitrust law at Penn, and for whom I worked as
a research assistant. Professor Schwartz remained as our co-counsel in the litigation
before Judge Murray Schwartz (no relation) in the Delaware District Court and in the
antidumping administrative proceeding in the United States Treasury Department.
4 A Westlaw search reveals over one hundred citations of reported cases in which
Henry Sawyer appeared as counsel from 1951 to the early 1990s. Of course, for much
of Henry's careerjudicial memoranda and opinions were not transmitted routinely to
Lexis and Westlaw. Thus, for example, there are no reported decisions in two significant Robinson-Patman Act cases Henry and I worked on (together with Edward M.
Posner),Joseph Walsh Tire Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., CA. No. 74-1310 (E.D. Pa.) and Hub
Tire Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., C.A. No. 75-85 (E.D. Pa.), cited in Broyerv. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
415 F. Supp. 193, 195 nn.1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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largely commercial, cases,5 the reason this Law Review has gathered
these tributes is because of Henry Sawyer's contribution in public interest litigation. And it was in that litigation that one always found
Henry Sawyer's heart and, above all, his voice in its most resonant and
powerful pitch.
Henry Sawyer usually is identified with his successes in two of the
century's most important Establishment Clause cases, School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp6 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.7 There is no
question that both cases constitute major legal landmarks in First
Amendment jurisprudence, as well as in the everyday life of any
American who has ever set foot in a public or sectarian school. Given
the lopsided votes in the Supreme Court, however-eight-to-one in
Schempp and seven-to-one in Lemon--a detractor might contend that
Henry Sawyer was just lucky enough to be in the right place at the
right time and won two cases that really did not depend on the power
and sound of that great voice. Although I would argue to the contrary-particularly given the reality that Henry lost before the Lemon
three-judge court-it seems to me hard to dispose of such detraction,
at least directly.
Another Supreme Court case, however, provides conclusive eviIn private litigation, Henry Sawyer probably was best known for his work in the
antitrust area, an expertise that began when he was (unsuccessful) trial counsel for the
plaintiff in Viking Theatre Corp. v. ParamountFilmDistributingCorp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir.
1963), though on the briefs and the certiorari petition, the Supreme Court did not
hear Sawyer's voice, but that of Edward Bennett Williams. The decision of the Court
of Appeals was affirmed by an equally divided Court. See 378 U.S. 123 (1964). Henry
always believed that his work for Viking Theatre led to General Electric's retaining him
in the civil electrical conspiracy price-fixing cases, a litigation so complex it became the
impetus for the later enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See, e.g., United States v. General
Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that state-mandated prayer and devotional Bible
reading in public schools are unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that state financial aid to nonpublic schools was
an
"excessive entanglement between government and religion" and therefore was unconstitutional under the First Amendments Religion Clauses).
a In Schemp, onlyJustice Stewart dissented, see 374 U.S. at 308-20, though Justices
Douglas and Brennan wrote concurrences to Justice Clark's opinion for the Court.
Lemon involved one Pennsylvania and two Rhode Island cases. Justice White concurred
in the Pennsylvania case and dissented in the Rhode Island cases, see 403 U.S. 661-71,
and Justices Douglas and Brennan wrote concurrences to ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the Court in the Rhode Island cases. Justice Marshall did not participate.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). District Judge Troutman wrote the majority opinion, in which DistrictJudge Luongojoined. Third Circuit
ChiefJudge Hastie dissented.
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dence that Henry Sawyer's voice indeed made a decisive difference,
not only in those two Establishment Clause cases, but also for the
cause of liberty in this country.
I refer to the case of Deutch v. United States.'0 At the time young
Bernhard Deutch came to Henry Sawyer's office, the nation was consumed in what we now call the McCarthy Era. The facts of Bernhard
Deutch's case demonstrate how far the Zeitgeist had taken our political
and legal life from its constitutional moorings-as well as from the
common "decency" to which Joseph Welch referred in his famous colloquy with Senator McCarthy."
Two months before Welch's rhetorical questions about Senator
McCarthy's "decency," Bernhard Deutch was working in the Physics
Building of the University of Pennsylvania. He was served with a subpoena that commanded him to appear in Albany, New York two days
later before a subcommittee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. Though still only a graduate student, Deutch had
the good sense to choose Henry Sawyer as his lawyer.
The subcommittee in its grace granted Henry's request for a continuance, and the appearance occurred three days later than scheduled, and in Washington, D.C. As Henry later described the
Kafkaesque scene in his Brief for Petitioner, "Upon appearance at the
committee's office in the House Office Building in Washington,
[Deutch] and his counsel were directly shown into an office in which
there were seated several unidentified men; he was 2forthwith sworn
and without preamble the questioning commenced."1
The committee counsel informed Deutch that
[D]uring hearings at Albany last week, the committee heard testimony

regarding the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating
among undergraduates at Cornell University, among certain graduates
at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca.
10 367 U.S. 456 (1961). I have elsewhere, in a very different context, discussed
Henry Sawyer's effect on the Supreme Court in Deutch. See Stewart Dalzell, Faces in the
Courtroom, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 961, 967-68 (1998).
1 The great Boston lawyer's words to Senator McCarthy, after McCarthy's gratuitous slander of Welch's young associate, bear repeating to give the flavor of the era in
which Sawyer represented political outcasts like Deutch: "Until this moment, Senator, I
think I never really gaged [sic] your cruelty or your recklessness.... Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency,
sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?" Special Senate Investigation on

Charges and CounterchargesInvolving Secretay of the Army Robert T. Stevens et aL: Hearing
Before the Special Subcomm. Investigations of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 83d Cong., at
2429 (1954) (statement ofJoseph N. Welch to SenatorJoseph McCarthy).
12 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) (No. 233).
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In connection with that testimony, the committee was informed that you
were a member of one or more of those groups.13

Whereupon, Deutch explained that he had met a charismatic
black law student at Cornell named Ross Richardson, who eventually
persuaded Deutch to join a small Communist Party cell. Richardson
would drive Deutch to the meetings and collect dues from him.
Although Deutch answered most of the subcommittee's questions,
he declined to answer five, all relating to people other than himself.
For example, the first question he declined to answer was:
1. The committee was advised that a witness by the name of Ross
Richardson has stated that you acted as liaison between a Communist
Party group on the campus and a member of the faculty at Cornell, and

that you knew the name of the member of that faculty, who was a member of the Communist
Party. Will you tell us who that member of the
14
faculty was?

As Henry Sawyer later told the Supreme Court, Deutch "respectfully told the committee that he was willing to tell all about his own
activities but that he could not, because of moral scruples, bring himself to inform on other people."' 5 In any event, Deutch made it clear
that the subcommittee easily could get all of the requested information from Ross Richardson.
When the House of Representatives voted a contempt citation
against Deutch, he was indicted for refusing to testify, a violation of 2
U.S.C. § 192.16 The bench trial took place in the District Court for the
District of Columbia in 1956, before District Judge Alexander
Holtzoff. In his brief opinion in support of the conviction as to four
of the five countsJudge Holtzoff not only gave a ringing endorsement
to the power of Congress to investigate domestic Communism in all its
details, but also summarily rejected Henry Sawyer's argument that the
particular questions were not pertinent to the subcommittee's inquiry.
13

I1. at 5-6.
The other questions and orders were:

14 I& at 8.

2. Will you tell the committee, please, the source of that $100 contribution, if it was made?
3. Where were these meetings held?
4. Were you acquainted with Homer Owen?
5. The witness is directed to give the name of the person by whom he was
approached.
Deutch v. United States, 280 F.2d 691, 692 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
is Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 7.
16 See 2 U.S.C § 192 (1997) (setting forth liability for refusing to
testify or produce
papers during a congressional investigation).
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To this contention Judge Holtzoff wrote that a congressional committee "has a right to obtain cumulative testimony" and that it may question "several witnesses to the same matter in order to check the accuracy of the information that it is obtaining." 17 Judge Holtzoff
acquitted Deutch on Count Three, holding that someone "may not be
punished for contempt of Congress merely for stating that he does
not remember."'
During its long pendency in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the case had become rather more difficult owing
to the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Barenblatt v. United
States.'9 In that case the majority upheld, over First Amendment objections, the power of a subcommittee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities to inquire into a witness's past or present membership in the Communist Party. As the Court of Appeals interpreted
Barenblattin Deutch's case, "[T]he Government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of
the questions were made to appear at the committee hearing with 'indisputable clarity.'" 20 The Court of Appeals's affirmance thus could
not have come as a surprise.
On July 13, 1960, when Henry Sawyer filed his petition for a writ
of certiorari to the District of Columbia Circuit, he was facing what
then had to have seemed like a hopeless enterprise. The Supreme
Court only a year before had decided Barenblatt,with its approval of
wide-ranging and intrusive power on the part of Communist-hunting
congressional committees. Though Barenblattwas decided by a vote of
five to four, the fifth vote was supplied by the Court's newest member,
Justice Potter Stewart, who joined Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker and Clark.2' Where Lloyd Barenblatt had cited the First
Amendment as the basis for his refusal to answer, Bernhard Deutch
only mentioned "moral scruples." True, Henry by this time had
achieved some success for another "unfriendly" witness on the
17

United States v. Deutch, 147 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.D.C. 1956).

18 Id.

19 360
20

U.S. 109 (1959).
Deutch, 280 F.2d at 695. In addition to Barenblatt,the panel also cited Watkins v.

United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), and flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958), for
the 2quoted proposition-all cases decided after the bench trial before judge Holtzoff.
Justice Black's dissent was unusually powerful, even for him, particularly in its
quiet anger in referring to the majority's "conclusion that on balance the interest of
the Government in stifling these freedoms [of speech, press, assembly and petition] is
greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised." 360 U.S. at 143
(Black,J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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grounds that a Senate subcommittee had failed to establish the subject
matter of the inquiry.22 But this argument was not available to him in
Deutch because, as seen above, the subcommittee counsel made the
purpose of Deutch's appearance quite explicit at the beginning of the
proceedings on April 12, 1954.2
When, probably very much to his surprise, the Supreme Court
granted his petition for a writ of certiorari, Henry Sawyer faced a
daunting task. The judicial branch seemed oblivious to Senator
McCarthy's death on May 2, 1957. Three years after that death, the
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed Judge Holtzoff, who was by
then one of the most accomplished district judges in the federal system24 (the Court of Appeals panel included later-to-be Chief Justice
Burger). The Barenblatt majority in 1959 included the intellectual
weight ofJustices Frankfurter and Harlan.
When it came time for the oral argument, however, Henry
brought with him his ultimate weapon: his voice. He used that voice
to tell quite a story. Henry stressed Ross Richardson's involvement in
keeping Deutch in the Party. He pointed out that when Deutch
wanted to resign his Party membership, Richardson retorted that
Deutch was a "white chauvinist" who could not stand having a black in
control. Deutch relented and remained in the Party until he left Cornell to attend the University of Pennsylvania for his graduate work.
After recounting these facts, I suspect from many years' experience with him that Henry Sawyer then allowed a long, pregnant pause
to fill the courtroom with silence. He always would do this before his
punch line, and what a powerful one he had that day for his audience
of nine. Doubtless reaching down to the lowest registers of that grave
In Knowles v. United States, 280 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1960), Henry won a reversal
on behalf of a woman discharged from her position as a librarian in Norwood, Massachusetts, who had been called three times to Washington to appear before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate.
When she appeared on July 29, 1955, "no statement was made as to the Subcommittee's purpose in calling her, or as to the subject matter of the inquiry." Id. at 698. Her
conviction therefore was reversed with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See id. at
700.
See supratext accompanying note 13.
24 Among his accomplishments, Holtzoff had, with William W. Barron, written a
22

treatise, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, that Professor Charles Alan Wright acknowledges was the "lineal" ancestor of our Wright and Miller. 1 CHARI.ES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MI=.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at vii (2d ed.

1982). The Supreme Court regarded Judge Holtzoff as "the person who almost certainly drafted" what became the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994).
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-56 (1984).
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voice of his that suitably could announce the Apocalypse, he then disclosed to the Court that, at all times, Ross Richardson worked as an
agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
On its face, Henry's shot at Ross Richardson was gratuitous and irrelevant to all but Bernhard Deutch and his advocate. Deutch was the
one who refused to answer the subcommittee's questions, not
Richardson. And Richardson's true role was utterly beside the point
regarding the pertinence of those five questions to the subcommittee's inquiry.
But we know that this ornament to Henry's recitativ not only was
relevant, but decisive for at least one other listener in that audience.
As Henry many years later reported to me, "Justice Potter Stewart
(hitherto on the government's side of this issue) leaned forward and
said, 'Is that in the record, Mr. Sawyer?' I said indeed it was inasmuch
as Richardson was the sole witness against Deutch at the trial.'
To
this Justice Stewart leaned back and said to a colleague (probably Justice Brennan), "'Outrageous... outrageous!'" in a volume "more voce
than sotto."26

In writing his opinion for the five-Justice majority reversing
Deutch's conviction, Justice Stewart, after recounting the basic facts,
mentioned, at the very end of one of those pregnant and powerful
footnotes the Supreme Court sometimes drops, that Ross Richardson
had joined the Party "at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. " 27 He then went on to hold for the Court that the questions indeed were not "pertinent to the committee's inquiry."
Technically speaking, Justice Harlan's dissent in Deutch had much
power, given the recent vintage of Barenblatt. But once the Court got
the whole story of Deutch's case, in truth and justice there is no doubt
that the conviction had to be reversed if the nation was to recover a
modicum of the decency that Joseph Welch and many others had
found so lacking in that poisonous time.
When Henry Sawyer's bass voice filled the silence of the Supreme
Court's chamber with the words, "Ross Richardson was at all times an
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," 28 can there be much
25 Letter

from Henry W. Sawyer to Stewart Dalzell 2-3 (Mar. 2, 1998) (on file with

author) [hereinafter Sawyer].
2 Id. at
3.
2 Deutch, 367 U.S.
at 460 n.4.
These were the words Henry recited to me that he actually said. The Supreme
Court Clerk's Office was unable to find a transcript of the oral argument in its retrievable records when I sought it in 1998 in writing the essay cited above in note 10.
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doubt that these words, more than Joseph Welch's oft-quoted comment to Senator McCarthy, truly began the end of this dark chapter in
our jurisprudence and national life? To be sure, that voice remained
jurisprudentially incorrect to some of the brightest and bestjudges for
some years after McCarthy's death-indeed, that voice so offended
the judicial sensitivities ofJustice Frankfurter in March of 1961 during
Sawyer's argument, that the learned Justice "turned his chair around,
facing backward" as Henry continued speaking.
Henry Sawyer's voice really did have that much power to it. True,
on a day-to-day basis it was often in the service of private interests,
since Henry had to make a living and someone had to pay for all of
that pro bono work. Indeed, Henry explicitly acknowledged to me
that his work on behalf of significant economic interests served these
larger ends.3 The truth of the matter is that I do not believe Henry
Sawyer ever made a dime representing Communists and other political outcasts. It was simply of no interest to him.
But Henry Sawyer always would say that he got much more out of
representing these clients who could not pay him. He unquestionably
was not speaking of gaining notoriety. He was talking about sometimes actually achieving justice. And with that great voice of his, he
Sawyer, supra note 25, at 2 & n.4. To get another sample of the flavor of the judicial atmosphere long after the echo had died to Joseph Welch's comment, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kaplan v. School District of Philadelphia,388
Pa. 213 (1957) will do rather well. When that Court ruled against Henry Sawyer's client, it began the opinion with the following two sentences:
On July 12, 1948, Samuel M. Kaplan, the plaintiff in this case, entered into a
contract with the School District of [Philadelphia], the defendant, to teach
English in the public schools of Philadelphia on a salary basis. So far as the
record shows, he demonstrated himself to be a competent teacher in his field,
but it was reported to the Superintendent of Philadelphia Schools that while
Kaplan was instructing the children in his classes how to express themselves in
English he was devoting time to an organization which, if successful in its
plans, would eventually have those children or their children's children speaking Russian in a Russian state.
Id. at 214 (Musmanno,J.).
30 To its credit, besides providing a significant financial subsidy, Drinker Biddle &
Reath itself withstood a good deal of criticism when Henry was at the height of representing accused Communists in the McCarthy Era. He once told me a rather touching
story in this respect. After Henry Drinker died, his secretary of many years reported
for the first time to Henry Sawyer that a representative of one of the firm's largest clients called to complain to Mr. Drinker about the young Sawyer representing some
Communists in a protracted Smith Act prosecution. After Mr. Drinker assured himself
that the client took no exception to Henry's legal abilities or ethical performanceindeed, the essence of the client's complaint was that too much talent was being put in
service of such disreputable people-Mr. Drinker advised the client that if he was so
upset he should take his business elsewhere.
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did more than that. He was one of the pillars of his time in securing
the liberties that benefit all Americans. Henry Sawyer's voice therefore spoke for every one of us.

